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622 FLORES v. BROWN [39 C.2d 
liability and it has become final, the judgment may never-
theless be reviewed and reversed on an appeal from an order 
granting a new trial on the issue of damages only. It is 
obvious that the foregoing unsound pronouncements are made 
in order to enable the majority to sustain its unsound position 
that the trial judge committed a gross, manifest and unmis-
takable abuse of discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial on the issue of damages only, and at the same 
time to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek redress for his 
patently serious injuries. In other words, the majority is 
compromising on the law in order to give plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to retry his case and probably obtain a fair award of 
damages. While I commend the majority for this display 
of human kindness, I cannot yield to a compromise which 
will necessarily throw the law into a state of confusion, 
especially when full justice may be accomplished by following 
settled rules of law. 
I would affirm the order. 
[S. F. No. 18460. In Bank. Oct. 9, 1952.] 
ANITA FLORES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
ERNEST W. BROWN et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
MARIA. ZAVALA., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ERNEST W. 
BROWN et al., Defendants; JACK R. MURRAY, Ap-
pellant. 
[1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Employer.-Negligence of trac-
tor owner who was towing trailer for benefit of its owner at 
time of accident may be imputed to the latter only if the 
former was acting as his agent or employee; if the tractor 
owner was hauling the trailer as a mere favor to its owner, 
or as an independent contractor, negligence may not be im-
puted. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Independent Contractors, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Master and Servant, § 3 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 168; [2] Independent 
Contractors,§ 3; [3-5] Automobiles,§ 243; [6, 7] Negligence,§ 97; 
[8, 11, 13] Husband and Wife, § 65(1), (2); [9, 10, 14] Husband 
and Wife, § 65(1); [12] Deaths, §§ 39, 59; [15] Husband and 
Wife, § 189(1); [16] New Trial, § 15. 
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[2] Independent Cbntractors-Bxistence of Relationship-'-Right 
of Qontrol.~Primary test for determining whether a person 
performing gratuitous services for another does so as the 
latter's agent is the same as that applied to determine whether 
one perforn1ing services for compensation' does so as an em-
ployee or as an independent contractor, and in both situations 
the determinative issue is whether or not the alleged prin-
cipal controlled or had the legal right to control the activities 
of the alleged agent. 
[3] Automobiles-Evidence-Agency.-When one person is driving 
another's automobile for the latter's benefit, an inference of 
agency may be . drawn, and right of control may be inferred 
frotn the owner's power over the way his automobile should 
be op:rated, particularly when he is present on the trip. 
[4T Id.~Bvidence-Agency.-If one person is riding in another's 
automobile, the right to control may not be inferred merely be-
cause the trip is undertaken for the passenger's benefit and 
the destination is selected by him, nor may the right to control 
be inferred merely from the fact that one person with his own 
equipment is . transporting another's goods. 
[5] Id.-Bvidence-Agency.-Where tractor owner at time of acci~ 
dent was towing another person's trailer with his own ,equip-
ment· in carrying out an apparently isolated transaction be-
tween the parties, no inference of agency 'may be drawn. 
[ 6] Negligence..:_ Imputed Negligence--Family Relationship~---Since 
mother and father are equally entitled to the custody of a 
minor child ( Civ. Code, § 197), if negligence is to be imputed 
from one to the other on an agency theory it must be because 
their relationship in caring for their child is in the nature of 
a joint enterprise, each being the agent of the other. 
[7] !d.-Imputed Negligence.:_Family Relatiomlhip,.:_Family rela-
tionship standing alone is insufficient t9 convert fa:ruily activi-
ties into joint enterprises for purposes of i171puting negligence. 
[8] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Per-
sonal Injuries.-In the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary, a cause of action for injuries to either husband or wife 
arising dudng .the marriage and .while they are living to-
gether is. community property, and the same rule is applicable 
to a cause of. actiQn for the wrongful death of a. minor child, 
or :for damages suffered by the. parents because (}f injury to 
such a child. 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 87; Am.Jur, Negligence, § 237 
et seq. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.lO"Yr.Supp., Community Propt)rty, §50 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Community Property, § 36. 
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[9] !d.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.-
In case of injuries to either husband or wife during the mar-
riage or to a minor child of the parties, it is ordinarily neces-
sary to impute the negligence of one spouse to the other to 
prevent the negligent spouse from profiting by his own wrong. 
[10] !d.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.-
When a marriage is dissolved, the interests of the parties in 
causes of action for injuries to either spouse during the mar-
riage or for injuries to a minor child become separate prop-
erty, it is possible to segregate the elements of damages that 
would, except for. the community property system, be con-
sidered personal to each spouse, and the objective of prevent-
ing unjust enrichment may be accomplished by barring only 
the interest of the negligent spouse or his estate. 
[11] !d.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.-
Where husband died in tire same accident in which his wife 
was injured and their minor son was killed, there will be no 
unjust enrichment if she is allowed to recover for her personal 
injuries and for the wrongful death of her son. 
[12] Death-Defenses: Damages.-Damages for wrongful death 
are the sum of those suffered by each heir or parent, and 
when the heirs are not husband and wife, the negligence of 
one is not imputed to the other because the recovery may pe 
limited to the nonnegligent heirs. 
[13] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Per-
sonal Injuries.-The right to recover for personal injuries or 
wrongful death of a minor child may turn on the chance of 
whether or not plaintiff's spouse survives until after the statute 
of limitations has run or judgment has been rendered, and if 
the child died after his father, his mother's action for his 
wrongful death could in no event be considered community 
property. 
[14] !d.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.-
When the husband is dead, not only is the reason for the rule 
imputing his negligence to his wife gone, but to apply it de-
feats its own purpose. 
[15] !d.-Actions-Defenses-Husband's Contributory Negligence. 
-Where husband died in same accident in which his wife was 
injured and their minor son was killed, a complete new trial 
may not properly be granted on the ground that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury that any negligence of the 
husband would not be a defense to the surviving wife's action 
for the wrongful death of her SOIL (Disapproving Solko v. 
Jones, 117 Cal.App. 372, 3 P.2d 1028; Coss·i v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 110 Cal.App. 110, 293 P. 663; and Dull v. Atchison, T. & 
S.F. Ry. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 473, 81 P.2d 158.) 
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[16] New Trial-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court: 
-When the issues of liability and damages are so interwoven 
that a new trial limited to damages alone would be unfair to 
defendant, as where the verdict in an action for the wrongful 
death of deceased husband was inconsistent under the instruc-
tions given with the verdict in an action for personal in-
juries of the surviving wife, the trial court may order a com-
plete new trial although the only motion is by plaintiff for a 
limited new trial. 
.APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County and from orders denying judgments notwith-
standing verdicts and granting a new trial. Leonard R. 
.A villa, Judge. .Appeal from judgments dismissed; orders 
affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions . 
.Actions for damages for wrongful death and for personal 
injuries arising out of a collision of vehicles. Orders deny-
ing motion of defendant Murray for judgments notwith-
standing verdicts reversed with directions; order granting 
plaintiffs a new trial reversed as against defendant Murray 
and affirmed as against defendant Brown. 
James F. Boccardo, David S. Lull and Edward ,J. Niland 
for Plaintiffs and .Appellants. 
Dana, Bledsoe & Smith and Morton B. Jackson for Defend-
ants and .Appellants. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On Sunday night, September 7, 1947, on 
Highway 101 near Madrone, an automobile driven by Her-
man Flores was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by defend-
ant Brown. Brown owned the tractor, but the trailer was 
owner by defendant Murray. With Mr. Flores in the front 
seat of the automobile was his wife, who was holding a baby; 
in the back, which had been converted into a small truck bed, 
were their son Felipe ( 19 years of age), their daughter Anita 
(14 years of age), and a friend, Nellie Zavala (17 years of 
age). Mr. Flores, Felipe, and Nellie Zavala were killed; Mrs. 
F'lores and Anita were injured . 
.As a result of the aceident, five aetions were filed against 
Brown aud Murray: the fin;t by Mrs. F'lores and het· snrviviug· 
ehildren for the death of Mt'. Flores; tl1e second by Mrc;. PI ores 
for her personal injuries; the third by .Anita, throug·h Mr:s. 
Flores as guardian ad litem, for .Anita's personal injuries ; 
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the fourth by Mrs. Flores for the death of Felipe; the fifth 
by Maria Zavala, mother of Nellie Zavala, for the death of 
Nellie Zavala. 
In each of the actions it was alleged that Brown was negli-
gent and that, in hauling the trailer, he was acting as Murray's 
agent. 
Defendants denied negligence and pleaded contributory 
negligence. Murray's motions for nonsuits and directed ver-
dicts were denied. The trial court instructed the jury that 
the contributory negligence of Mr. Flores would bar recovery 
for his death and would also be imputed to Mrs. Flores to bar 
recovery for her personal injuries. vVith respect to the other 
three actions, the jury was instructed that the defense of con-
tributory negligence of Mr. Flores was not applicable. The 
jury returned the following verdicts : 
1. In the Mr. Flores action, for defendants. 
2. In the Mrs. Flores action, for plaintiff in the amount 
of $5,000, against both defendants. 
3. In the .Anita action, for plaintiff in the amount of 
$15,000, against both defendants. 
4. In the Filipe action, for plaintiff in the amount of 
$5,000, against both defendants. 
5. In the Zavala action, for plaintiff in the amount of 
$5,000, against both defendants. 
The motions of both defendants for judgments notwith-
standing the verdicts were denied. 
Plaintiffs moved for a complete new trial in the Mr. Flores 
action and for a limited new trial on the issue of damages 
only in each of the other actions. Murray moved for a com-
plete new trial in each of the actions except the Mr. Flores 
action. Brown moved for a complete new trial in the Mrs. 
Flores action and in the Felipe action. 
The trial court granted a complete new trial as to all 
actions, all parties, and all issues. In doing so he stated 
that separate consideration of each motion might lead to a 
new trial only of certain issues in certain actions, with the 
result that the case would be even more complicated than 
at the first trial. He also observed that the various verdicts 
were not unanimous and were in part inconsistent and that 
they were probably compromise verdicts. He concluded that 
"substantial justice" required that the entire case be retried. 
There is no appeal from the order granting a complete 
new trial in the Mr. Flores action, and that order is now final. 
Oet.1952] FLORES v. BROWN 
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There is no appeal from the order granting a complete 
new trial in the Mrs. Flores action, but Murray has appealed 
from the judgment. Since the new trial order is now final, 
that judgment has been finally vacated and the appeal there-
from must be dismissed. 
In the remaining three actions, plaintiffs have appealed 
from the order granting complete new trials. Under the 
provisions of rule 3a of the Rules on Appeal, Murray has 
appealed from the judgment in each of these actions, and 
Brown has appealed from the judgment in the Felipe action. 
Since no question is raised as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a finding of Brown's negligence or of 
Mr. Flores's contributory negligence, it is unnecessary to 
review the evidence relating to the happening of the accident. 
Murray contends that there was no evidence that Brown 
was his employee or agent, and that therefore the trial court 
erred in denying his motions for judgments notwithstanding 
the· verdicts. The only evidence introduced on this issue was 
the testimony of Brown and a deposition of Murray. It may 
be summarized as follows: Both Brown and Murray were in 
the trucking business and had known each other for many 
years. Each owned a tractor and two trailers. A few weeks 
before the accident, Brown has secured a contract to haul 
pears from Lakeport to Yuba City during the canning season. 
Since he did not have enough equipment to handle all of the 
hauling himself, he arranged with Murray to assist him. 
Murray sent his equipment and a driver from Los Angeles 
to Lakeport. Brown used Murray's equipment on a trip to 
trip basis and paid Murray for the amounts so hauled. The 
job ended about two weeks before the accident, and Murray's 
driver returned to Los Angeles with Murray's tractor and 
one trailer, leaving the other trailer in Lakeport. Brown felt 
obligated to assist Murray in returning this second trailer to 
Los Angeles, and in a conversation it was agreed that when 
Brown was next in Lakeport with a tractor he would take 
the trailer as far as King City, unless Murray had picked 
it up sooner. Pursuant to this understanding Brown picked 
UJil the trailer at Lakeport, and while he was hauling it to 
King City, the accident occurred. Brown had business of 
his own to attend to in Lakeport on the day he picked up the 
trailer, but he would have made the trip in his automobile 
rather than in his tractor, had he not planned to take Murray's 
trailer to King City. No compensation was contemplated 
or given for this service. 
628 FLORES v. BROWN [39 C.2d 
[1] Although it is clear from the foregoing evidence that 
at the time of the accident, Brown was towing Murray's 
trailer for the latter's benefit, Brown's negligence may be 
imputed to Murray only if Brown was acting as his agent or 
employee. If Brown was hauling the trailer as a mere 
favor to Murray, or as an independent contractor, negligence 
may not be imputed. (Edwards v. Freeman, 34 Cal.2d 589, 
592 [212 P.2d 883]; 111aZloy v. Fang, 37 Cal.2d 356, 370 [232 
P.2d 241] .) 
[2] The primary test for determining whether a person 
performing gratuitous services for another does so as the 
latter's agent is the same as that applied to determine whether 
one performing services for compensation does so as an em-
ployee or as an independent contractor, and in both situa-
tions the determinative issue is whether or not the alleged 
principal controlled or had the legal right to control the 
activities of the alleged agent. (Edwards v. Freeman, supra, 
and cases cited; Malloy v. Fang, supra, and cases cited.) ,Ac-
cordingly, it is unnecessary to decide whether the jury could 
reasonably infer that Brown was not acting gratuitously. It 
need only be determined whether there is any evidence from 
which the jury could infer that Murray had the right to con-
trol the manner in which the job was done. 
There is nothing in the evidence of the business relations 
between Brown and Murray from which that right could be 
inferred. Both men were independent truckers, and Brown 
had not in the past been Murray's employee. In fact the 
evidence indicates that either Brown had employed Murray 
or engaged him as an independent contractor to haul such 
loads as Brown wished. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the jury could infer the 
right to control from the fact that Brown was towing Murray's 
trailer with permission for Murray's benefit. [3] It has 
frequently been held that when one person is driving an-
other's automobile for the latter's benefit an inference of 
agency may be drawn. (Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454, 461 
[139 P.2d 645] ; Perry v. McLaughlin, 212 Cal. 1, 14 [297 P. 
554]; Graf v. Harvey, 79 Cal..App.2d 64, 69 [179 P.2d 348]; 
Cope v. Goble, 39 Cal.App.2d 448, 456 [103 P.2d 598] ; DuBois 
v. Owen, 16 Cal.App.2d 552, 556 [60 P.2d 1019] .) In such 
eases the right to control may be inferred from the owner's 
power over the way his automobile should be operated, par-
ticularly when he is present on the trip. [4] On the other 
hand, it is settled that if one person is riding in another's 
Oct. 1952] FLORES v. BROWN 
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aut®mobile, the right to control may not be inferred merely 
because the trip is undertaken for the passenger's benefit and 
the destination is selected by him. (Edwards v. Freeman, 
supr-a, 34 Cal.2d 589, 592, 593; Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 
168, 174-176 [223 P. 470]; Bryant v. Pacific Elect1"ic Ry. Co., 
174 Cal. 737, 742 [164 P. 385]; Lowe v. Lee, 95 Cal.App.2d 
685, 689 [213 P.2d 767] ; Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal.App.2d 
449, 452 [175 P.2d 260]; see, also, Stoddard v. Fiske, 35 Cal. 
App. 607, 609-610 [170 P. 663] .) Similarly, the right to con-
trol may not be inferred merely from the fact that one per-
son with his own equipment is transporting another's goods. 
(Clarke v. Hernandez, 79 Cal.App.2d 414,424 [179 P.2d 834]; 
Preo v. Roed, 99 Cal.App. 372, 380 [278 P. 928]; see, also, 
Gaskill v. Calaveras Cement Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 120, 124 
[226 P.2d 633]; Walton v. Donohue, 70 Cal.App. 309, 314 
[233 P. 76] .) In both of these latter situations in which an 
owner is driving his own vehicle, the right to control its 
operations will ordinarily rest with him, and accordingly, in 
the absence of other evidence, it cannot be inferred that he 
has surrendered that right by agreeing to carry the person or 
property of another. [5] The facts of the present case 
bring it within the foregoing rule. Brown was towing Mur-
ray's trailer with his own equipment in carrying out an ap-
parently isolated transaction between the parties, and the 
fact that he was towing Murray's property instead of carry-
ing his person or his goods is immaterial. (Walton v. Donohue, 
supra; Gaskill v. Calaveras Cement Co., supra.) Accordingly, 
Murray's motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts 
should have been granted. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting 
complete new trials against Brown in the last three causes 
of action instead of new trials limited to the issue of damages. 
Brown justifies the complete new trial order in the action for 
the wrongful death of Felipe on the ground that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury that contributory negli-
gence on the part of Mr. Flores would not bar Mrs. Flores's 
recovery for the death of Felipe. He relies upon Keena v. 
United Railroads of S.F., 57 Cal.App. 124 [207 P. 35] ; Cossi 
v. Southern Pac. Co., llO Cal.App. 110 [293 P. 6631 ; Dull 
v. Atchison, T. &; E.F. R. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 473 [81 P.2d 
158] ; and Kataoka v. May Dept. Stores Co., 60 Cal.App.2i1 177 
[140 P.2d 467], for the proposition that the negligence of one 
parent that contributes to the death of a minor child must 
be imputed to the other in any action for wrongful death 
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against a third party. All of these cases dealt with negligence 
on the part of the mother, and in each it was said that such 
negligence would be imputed to the father, either because the 
mother was acting as agent for the community in caring for 
the child, or because the recovery would be community prop-
erty in which she would have an interest. 
[6] Since the mother and father are equally entitled to the 
custody of a minor child ( Civ. Code, § 197), if negligence is to 
be imputed from one to the other on an agency theory it must 
be because their relationship in caring for their child is in the 
nature of a joint enterprise, each being the agent of the other. 
In view of their equal rights in this respect it cannot be said 
that the mother is necessarily the agent and the husband the 
principal. [7] Since the decision in the Keena case, how-
ever, where the agency doctrine was enunciated, it has been 
settled that the family relationship standing alone is not 
sufficient to convert family activities into joint enterprises for 
purposes of imputing negligence. (Campagna v. Market St. 
Ry. Co., 24 Cal.2d 304, 309 [149 P.2d 281] ; Cox v. Kaufman, 
77 Cal.App.2d 449, 452 [175 P.2d 260]. See, also, Spence v. 
Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 214 [193 P. 255, 14 A.L.R. 1083] ; Bryarnt 
v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 742 [164 P. 385]; San-
filippo v. Lesser, 59 Cal.App. 86, 88 [210 P. 44] ; Hill v. 
Jacquemart, 55 Oal.App. 498, 501-502 [203 P. 1021].) 
Since there is no evidence in addition to the family re-
lationship of a joint enterprise between Mr. and Mrs. Flores, 
Mr. Flores's negligence may be imputed to his wife, if at all, 
only because the cause of action for the wrongful death of 
Felipe was community property. 
[8] In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, it is 
settled that a cause of action for injuries to either the husband 
or the wife arising during the marriage and while they are 
living together is community property (Zaragosa v. Craven, 
33 Cal.2d 315, 318-321 [202 P.2d 73], and eases cited), and 
the same rule is applicable to a cause of action for the wrong-
ful death of a minor child, or for damages suffered by the 
parents because of injury to such a chHd. (Fuerntes v. Tucker, 
31 Cal.2d 1, 10 f187 P.2d 752] ; Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 
288, 301 f144 P.2d 356] ; Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond etc. 
Co., 66 Cal.App. 261, 272 [226 P. 28].). [9] Accordingly, in 
all of these situations it is ordinarily necessary to impute th.e 
negligence of one spouse to the other to prevent the negligent 
spouse from profiting by his own wrong. (Moody v. So~tthern 
Pac, Oo. 1 167 Cat 786, 790 [141 P. 388] i Basler v. Sacramento 
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aas &: Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 514, 518 [111 P. 530, Ann.Cas. 
1912A 642]; see, also, Rosenbloom v. Southern Pac. Co., 59 
Cal..App. 102, 107 [210 P. 53].) [10] When the marriage is 
dissolved, however, the interests in any of these causes of action 
become separate property, and it becomes possible to segre-
gate the elements of damages that would, except for the com-
munity property system, be considered personal to each 
spouse. Under these circumstances the objective of prevent-
ing unjust enrichment may be accomplished by barring only 
the interest of the negligent spouse or his estate. 
[11] Mr. Flores died in the same accident in which his 
wife was injured. 'fo allow her to recover for her personal 
injuries will in no way enrich Mr. F'lores or those who might 
take through him. Similarly, there will be no unjust enrich-
ment if Mrs. Flores is allowed to recover for the wrongful 
death of her son. [12] Damages for wrongfuldeath are the 
sum of those suffered by each heir or parent (Fuentes v. 
Tucker, 31 Cal.2d 1, 10 [187 P.2d 752] ; Estate of Riccomi, 185 
Cal. 458, 462 [197 P. 97, 14 .A.L.R. 509] ), and accordingly, 
when the heirs are not husband and wife, the negligence of one 
is not imputed to the others because the recovery may be 
limited to the nonnegligent heirs. (Bowler v. Roos, 213 Cal. 
484, 485-486 [2 P.2d 817]; Bowen v. Kizirian, 105 Cal . .App. 
286, 290 [287 P. 570).) Similarly, in this case the damages 
will be limited to those suffered by Mrs. Flores and the recov-
ery will be hers alone. 
[13] It is contended, however, that the rights of the par-
ties arising out of an accident must be determined as of the 
time that the causes of action arise, and that the right to 
recover for personal injuries or the wrongful death of a mi-
nor child should not turn upon the chance of whether or not 
the plaintiff's spouse survives until after the statute of limi-
tations has run or judgment has been rendered. It is not 
unusual, however, for the chance chronology of death to 
determine whether recovery may be had. It does so in all 
tort actions that abate on the death of one or the other of the 
parties. It would govern here, even if we were to hold that 
the determinative issue was whether Felipe died before or 
after his father. If he died after his father, his mother's 
action for his wrongul death could in no event be considered 
community property. Although there is evidence from which 
the jury could have found that Mr. Flores survived his son, 
we think this issue was properly not presented to them. Un-
doubtedly, convenience and certainty in litigation would be 
G32 FLORES v. BROWN [39 C.2d 
sPrYed if facts occ11rring after the accrual of a cause of action 
could be ignored, but benefits so achieved would be far out-
weighed by the hardship and injustice of applying a rule de-
signed to prevent unjust enrichment after the reason for it has 
ceased to exist. (See Civ. Code, § 3510.) [14] When the 
husband is dead, not only is the reason for the rule imputing 
his negligence to his· wife gone, but to apply it defeats its 
own purpose. It is but a windfall to a defendant who negli-
gelltly injures a wife or causes the death of a minor child 
that recovery may be barred because the wife's husband was 
also negligent. Although allowing the negligent defendant 
to escape liability has been considered a lesser evil than allow-
iug the negligent spouse to profit from his own wrong, surely 
the former evil may not,be balanced by the latter when the lat-
ter is no longer present. [15] Accordingly, the order grant-
ing a complete new trial cannot be sustained on the ground that 
the trial court erred in instructing the jury that negligence of 
Mr. Flores, if any, would not be a defense to Mrs. Flores's 
action for the wrongful death of Felipe. To the extent that 
Solko v. Jones, 117 Cal.App. 372 [3 P.2d 1028]; Cossi v. 
Smdhern Pac. Co., 110 Cal.App. 110 [293 P. 663] ; and Dull 
v. Atchison, T. &; S.F. Ry. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 473 [81 P.2d 
158], are inconsistent with the foregoing they are disapproved. 
Brown did not move for a new trial in the actions for 
Anita Flores's personal injuries and for Maria Zavala's 
wrongful death, and as indicated above, his motion for a new 
trial in the action for the wrongful death of Felipe cannot be 
supported on the ground that the jury was erroneously in-
structed with respect to imputed negligence. Plaintiffs, how-
eYer, moved for a new trial on the issue of damages alone in 
all of these actions. The question is presented, therefore, 
wl).ether in view of plaintiffs' motions, the court erred in 
granting a new trial on all issues against Brown in these 
actions. 
[16] It has recently been settled that when the issues of 
liability and damages are so interwoven that a new trial 
limited to damages alone would be unfair to the defendant, 
the trial court may order a complete new trial although the 
only motion is by the plaintiff for a limited new trial. (Hama-
saki v. Flotho, ante, p. 602 [248 P.2d 910].) 
In the present case the verdicts were not unanimous, and 
the verdict in the action for the wrongful death of Mr. 
Plon•s was inconsistent, under the instructions given, with 
the verdict in the action for the personal injuries of Mrs. 
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Flores. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the 
trial court erred in concluding that the verdicts were prob-
ably the result of compromise and that substantial justice re-
quired a complete new trial. 
The appeals from the judgments are dismissed. The order 
denying Murray's motion for judgments notwithstanding the 
verdicts as to the last three causes of action is reversed and 
the trial court is directed to grant his motion as to those ac-
tions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629.) The order granting a new 
trial is reversed to the extent that it orders a new trial against 
Murray in those actions, and affirmed to the extent it orders 
a new trial against Brown. Murray shall recover his costs on 
appeal. The other parties shall bear their own costs. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Shaner, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
On the question of limited new trials, I adhere to the views 
expressed by me in Leipert v. Honolcl, ante, p. 471 [247 P.2d 
324], and Hamasaki v. Flotho, ante, p. 613 [248 P.2d 910]. 
In addition, however, I believe that it was proper to deny de-
fendant Murray's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict against him, because it is quite clear that the evi-
dence was sufficient to show that defendant Brown was acting 
as Murray's agent at the time of the accident and the latter 
was therefore liable on the basis of respondeat superior. 
From the record it appears that while the contract was being 
performed Brown and Murray were engaged in either a 
joint trucking enterprise or Murray was the agent of Brown 
as the latter had the contract and was using Murray's trailer 
in the performance of the trucking operation. Although the 
trucking work had been finished, Murray's trailer was still 
at the place of operation, many miles from Murray's home 
and place of business in Los Angeles and from whence it 
came when the trucking job was commenced. Hence the 
association between Brown and Murray was still in existence. 
As the concluding step in the aflsociation, Brown felt obli-
gated to Murray to aid in retnrning the latter's trailer to 
I~os Angeles and hence agreed that he would pick up the 
trailer and retnrn it to T~os Angeles. That he did, and the 
aceident oecnrred while he was on that trip. There is a 
clear inference from these facts that Brown was acting as 
Murray's agent on that trip. It is conceded by the majority 
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that where a person drives another's automobile for the lat-
ter's benefit (precisely the instant case) an inference or 
presumption arises that the driver is acting as the owner's 
agent. That such is the law has been held in many cases. It is 
said in Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454, 461 [139 P.2d 645] : "As 
to the liability of the defendant Arthur Gigli, the record 
shows that defendant Corti took possession of the Dodge car 
for the use, benefit and accommodation and under the di-
rection of Arthur and for the purpose of taking it to Rocca's 
for Arthur. Under these circumstances Arthur was the prin-
cipal and Corti was his agent. The negligence of the latter 
was therefore imputable to Arthur." 
The same rule has been stated repeatedly (Maberto v. Wolfe, 
106 Cal.App. 202 [289 P. 218] ; McWhirter v. Fuller, 35 Cal. 
App. 288 [170 P. 417] ; Randolph v. Hunt, 41 Cal.App. 739 
[183 P. 358]; Dierks v. Newsom, 49 Cal.App. 789 [194 P. 518]; 
Navarro v. Somerfeld, 35 Cal.App.2d 35 [94 P.2d 623]; 
Gates v. Pendleton, 184 Cal. 797 [195 P. 664] ; Jacobus v. 
Brero, 190 Cal. 374 [212 P. 617] ; Grover v. Sharp & Fellows 
etc. Co., 66 Cal.App.2d 736 [153 P.2d 83] ; Graf v. Harvey, 
79 Cal.App.2d 64 [179 P.2d 348].) 
Hence in the instant case an inference arises that Brown 
was Murray's agent which is sufficient to justify the verdicts 
against Murray. 
The majority endeavors to evade that rule by stating that 
the case is more like one where a trip is taken in the owner's 
car for a passenger's benefit, in which it is said that the 
cases hold there is no inference that the owner is the pas-
senger's agent, or where one is transporting another's goods 
in the former's car, in which the cases are said to hold that 
there is no inference of agency. That answer is not satis-
factory for several reasons. There is no sound reason why 
the rule should be any different merely because Brown was 
towing Murray's trailer with his own truck. The fact re-
mains that he was operating Murray's trailer and his own 
truck on the highway for Murray's benefit. The case is not 
like those relied upon by the majority such as Edwards v. 
Freeman, 34 Cal.2d 589 [212 P.2d 883], where the owner 
of the car did nothing more than give a ride to his mother 
to town where she had her eyes tested. She was merely 
being given a ride in the owner's car. It was not a case of 
a person (Brown) operating another's (Murray's) trailer on 
the highways for the benefit of the latter. Here there was a 
clear business relationship between Brown and Murray that 
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was still continuing when the accident happened. To take 
from the jury this issue of fact is just another instance in 
which the majority has deprived a litigant of his right to a 
jury trial in violation of the constitutional mandate. 
In view of the fact that a motion for a complete new trial 
was made in each of the actions the court had the power to 
grant the same. This is true even though the motion in Mr. 
Flores's action was made by plaintiff and a similar motion 
was made by defendant Murray in each of the other actions 
and by defendant Brown in the Mrs. Flores and Felipe 
actions. Therefore, we are not faced with the problem pre-
sented in the Hamasaki case, supra, where the only motion 
granted by the trial court was plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial on the issue of damages only. 
I would, therefore, affirm both the order denying the mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts and the 
order granting a complete new trial on all issues. 
Plaintiffs and appellants' petition for a rehearing was 
denied November 3, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18445. In Bank. Oct. 9, 1952.] 
DOROTHY E. A.THA., Respondent, v. E. H. BOCKIUS 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Chattel Mortgages-Law Governing.-A chattel mortgage 
executed and recorded in accordance with the law of Texas 
where it was made is, in the absence of other considerations, 
enforceable in that state. 
[2] Id.-Law Governing.-Under the law of comity a chattel mort-
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tion of the comity doctrine in respect to foreign liens on motor 
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[2] See 3 Cal.Jur.lO-Yr.Supp., Chattel Mortgages,§ 9a; Am.Jur., 
Chattel Mortgages, § 19 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 74 
et seq. 
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